In this paper we consider a potential investor who contemplates entering an uncertain new market under two conditions: i) a prerequisite for the project to take place is the purchase of a discrete input from an upstream …rm with market power and ii) the completion of the investment is conditional on the participation of an investment partner who is willing to bear some of the investment cost receiving compensation in return.
Introduction
Innovation is an important factor for a company's success and a crucial explanation for observed di¤erentials in performance (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004) . Consequently, a fundamental problem that a …rm faces has to do with the decision to invest in a new product, technology or service market. These kinds of managerial decisions are usually characterized by risky, irreversible and lumpy investments that are often beyond the resources of a single …rm (Chesbrough and Schwartz, 2007) and, as a result, an investment partner willing to share the cost of betting on the success of the business plan under consideration is frequently sought after (Kogut, 1991) . According to Quinn (2000) , using partnerships "companies have lowered innovation costs and risks by 60% to 90%, while similarly decreasing cycle time and leveraging their internal investments by tens to hundreds of times".
Investment partnerships might take the form of joint ventures, independent or corporate venture capital investments, strategic alliances or merges. Irrespective of the exact nature of the partnership, the underlying reasons that motivate it are common. When joining forces with another …rm, an investment partner anticipates …nancial returns and/or a window on new technologies that correspond to future growth opportunities. 1 As noted by Miller and Modigliani (1961) , a signi…cant Department of Civil, Architectural and Environmental Engineering, University of Padova, Via Marzolo 9, 35131, Padova, Italy. Email: dimitrios.zormpas@studenti.unipd.it. Special thanks to Michele Moretto and Luca Di Corato for valuable comments and suggestions. 1 See e.g. Vrande and Vanhaverbeke (2013), Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a) and Reuer and Tong (2007) .
part of many …rms'market values consists of such future growth opportunities i.e. assets not yet in place. Myers (1977) argued that these assets are analogous to …nancial options, in the sense that one has the right but not the obligation to invest, and consequently stock option pricing methods should be used for their evaluation. The real option approach acknowledges that investment opportunities are options on real assets and provides a way to apply option pricing methods to investment decision problems. It claims that the classic net present value rule is not always valid and argues that the option to postpone an investment decision characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility has to be taken into account. McDonald and Siegel (1986) gave an expression for the option value and showed that the optimal investment strategy is a trigger strategy in the sense that one should invest as soon as the project value is greater than a threshold, the value of which increases with uncertainty. 2 In this paper we use the real option approach in order to describe the interaction among i) a …rm who is contemplating entering an uncertain new market, ii) a …rm who acts like an investment partner partly …nancing this project receiving a share of the …nal investment in return and iii) an upstream supplier with market power who is responsible for the provision of an input that is necessary for the potential investor to start producing and selling. Using a stochastic dynamic programming model, we examine how the involvement of the two alien agents a¤ects the investment timing and how the observed timing discrepancies are re ‡ected on the value of the option to invest. We show that both external funding and input outsourcing cause the postponement of the investment and we demonstrate how this erodes the project's option value. Comparing the two e¤ects we …nd that external funding is preferred to input outsourcing, in the sense that the distortion with respect to the optimal, vertically integrated, case is more limited. We then focus on the three-agent case where the synchronous e¤ect of outsourcing and external funding is discussed. Using a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework we show that, as expected, this represents the worst-case scenario since we have the investment timing reaching its maximum and, consequently, the value of the option to invest reaching its minimum. In the concluding part of the paper we approach the problem anew replacing the original non-cooperative game-theoretic setting with a Nash bargaining solution. Given a set of participation conditions, we show that the presence of the two alien agents is still a¤ecting the investment timing. However, in this case the two e¤ects are opposing each other. Outsourcing is still causing the postponement of the project but now external funding is favoring the (ine¢ cient) acceleration of the investment. A comparison between the two shows that the …rst force is always prevailing, a result that highlights the importance of the nature of the sunk investment cost when investment partnerships are considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief overview of the related literature. In Section 3 we present in detail the model set-up demonstrating the connection with previous work and in Section 4 we discuss the three-agent case. In Section 5 we solve the problem under Nash bargaining and Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
This work relies on an established body of papers that integrate two research streams: the basic theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , and the classic presentation of vertical relationships as described e.g. by Tirole (1988) . 3 Real option analysis has been used to study joint ventures (Kogut, 1991 The most closely related work we have identi…ed is in corporate …nance and supply chain management, most notably Lambrecht (2004), Banerjee et al. (2014) and Chen (2012) , Lukas and Welling (2014) . Lambrecht (2004) analyzes a merger between two …rms motivated by economies of scale using two di¤erent sequences of moves. According to the …rst (friendly merger), one of the two parties is choosing the optimal timing and then the terms of the merger are commonly decided, whereas, according to the second (hostile takeover), the two parties commit to the terms of the merger …rst and the timing is decided second. A comparison between the two suggests that, the way synergies are divided may in ‡uence the timing of the merger. Similarly, Banerjee et al. (2014) use a two-stage decision-making framework in which the parties determine the sharing rule as an outcome of Nash bargaining and one of them makes the timing decision related to the exercise of the jointly held option. Considering both cash transfers and ownership stakes, they show that when the exercise decision is made …rst, timing is always optimal 4 whereas, when the sharing rule is determined …rst (hostile takeover case from Lambrecht, 2004) investment timing is socially ine¢ cient unless a combination of stake in the project and a cash transfer is used. In this case, it generally matters which …rm makes the timing decision and how the bargaining power is distributed.
In the supply chain management literature, Chen (2012) models a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The two-stage optimization problem evolves in the following way. In the …rst stage, the two agents negotiate over the optimal quantities whereas in the second stage, they coordinately determine the optimal timing of investing in the supply chain under uncertain demand. The results show that the volatility of demand shock has an ambiguous e¤ect on the investment threshold with increasing impacts at lower level and decreasing impacts at higher level of uncertainty. Lastly, Lukas and Welling (2014) model the optimal timing of "climatefriendly" investments in a supply chain framework and enrich the contribution of Chen (2012) in the following ways. Firstly, they adopt a non-cooperative real option game setting according to which the optimal timing is decided, not jointly but by one of the participating …rms and, secondly, they extend the two-echelon supply chain allowing for more than two participants showing that a supply chain becomes less e¢ cient with every additional link as the timing distortion builds up.
In spite of the di¤erences in their analyses, what all these papers have in common is the nature of the investment cost which is tacitly assumed to be exogenous. As Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014) point out, this assumption seems reasonable when the investment is performed largely inhouse, as may occur with R&D, but this is not always the case. For instance, there are many other cases in which the completion of a …rm's investment project depends on an upstream supplier who is responsible for the provision of a discrete input. In that case, the cost of the single …rm's investment is endogenous since it is speci…ed by the vertical relationship between the external supplier and the potential investor.
The novelty of our work lies on the fact that the investment cost is explicitly assumed to be endogenous. We begin by analyzing a non-cooperative game-theoretic setting according to which, the optimal timing is decided by the investment partner whereas the sharing rule is decided by the project originator, given the price of an indispensable input provided by an external supplier with market power. We subsequently readdress this three-agent 5 problem deriving the conditions under which it would be socially preferable to determine the sharing rule as an outcome of Nash bargaining and we …nd that the presence of the upstream …rm makes a substantial di¤erence when we consider the timing and the value of the option to invest in a given project, both in the cooperative (Nash bargaining solution) and in the non-cooperative case.
3 The model
The basic set-up
Firm A is a risk neutral potential investor willing to enter a market with growing but uncertain demand. The pro…t ‡ow that A is cashing upon investment is y t M where M > 0 is the instantaneous monopolistic pro…t per unit of y t and y t is a stochastic scale parameter that ‡uctuates according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
where > 0 is the drift, > 0 is the instantaneous volatility and dW t is the standard increment of a Wiener process (standard Brownian motion) uncorrelated over time satisfying E [dW t ] = 0 and E dW 2 t = dt. A discrete input is a prerequisite for A to operate in the …nal market and this input is supplied by an upstream …rm with market power that we call C. It is assumed that C prices this input taking into consideration the structural parameters of the geometric Brownian motion presented above, but without ever observing y t . 6 The completion of the project depends also on the cooperation of an investment partner B who is willing to bear a share of the investment cost, asking for compensation in return. Contrary to the upstream …rm, we assume that the investment partner is in a position to continuously and veri…ably observe the ‡uctuations of the scale parameter over time. One can argue that this is a sensible assumption since B will consider joining forces with A only if s/he has enough information for the considered project. For instance, we can think of B as a …nancial institution and A as a customer asking for a business loan. The customer will need to present a thorough business plan in order to convince the …nancial institution about the promising character of the project. In this case, the potential investor is basically voluntarily sharing her/his information endowment with the investment partner. Alternatively, one can assume that B might actually be in a position to observe the scale parameter over time without A's help. For instance, Mulherin and Boone (2000) as well as Vrande and Vanhaverbeke (2013) report evidence for signi…cant industry clustering for merger and acquisition activities. These …ndings support the argumentation from Puranam et al. (2009) and Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005b) who suggest that …rms seem to seek ventures similar to 5 Note that our framework involves three agents of di¤erent type: the project originator, the investment partner and the input supplier. It is true that models with more than two agents have already been analyzed in the literature. Lukas and Welling (2014) , the types of agents are always two. The introduction of a third type is the key originality of our framework. 6 As noted by Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014) , if C is in a position to continuously and veri…ably observe the state of yt, then s/he can expropriate the project by choosing a suitable input price. Here we assume that the upstream …rm has no access to this kind of information. their own because this appears to facilitate the possible integration of technological resources in the future.
Before analyzing the three-agent case where the interaction among A, B and C is discussed, we brie ‡y review the problem under (i) vertical integration and (ii) outsourcing or partial external funding (but not both).
Vertical Integration
The vertically integrated case will be our benchmark. In this simpli…ed setting it is assumed that the potential investor produces the input in-house funding privately the completion of the project.
Following the real option literature, we keep in mind that there is some ‡exibility when we consider an investment opportunity under irreversibility and uncertainty. As …rstly reported by McDonald and Siegel (1986) , the ability to delay an irreversible investment expenditure is an important source of ‡exibility that profoundly a¤ects the decision to invest. A will only invest when the project's expected payo¤ exceeds the cost of the investment by the option value of waiting to invest. 7 Assuming that the initial market size is positive and su¢ ciently small so that a delay of the investment is preferable, the optimal investment time point V I is derived through the solution of the following maximization problem:
where
r a is the value of the project, 1) + r = 0, r (> ) is the common to all …rms discount rate, 8 I > 0 is the sunk cost of producing the input in-house and V I = inf t 0 y t = y V I is the random …rst time point that y t hits the barrier y V I which is the market size that triggers the investment. The expressions for F V I A (y) and are standard in the real option literature (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , Chapters 5-6 and Dixit (1993), Section 2). From the …rst-order condition we have
As expected, y V I is increasing in the sunk investment cost I and the volatility but is decreasing in the present value of the pro…t ‡ow M r . 9 In words, a …rm stands to gain more by holding, rather than exercising, an investment option with a high strike price (I in this case), a high underlying asset volatility ( in this case) but small return ( M r in this case). 10 Combining Eq. (2) with Eq. (3) we obtain the value of the option to invest 
These results lead to the …rst proposition: More precisely, they …nd that entrepreneurs account for the value of the option to delay entering a new market when contemplating such a decision. 8 The inequality r > guarantees convergence. 9 Note that the e¤ect of volatility on the investment threshold passes through . 1 0 Note that the classic net present value rule would dictate the lower investment threshold y N P V = r M I. As one can see, even a risk neutral potential investor is sensitive to uncertainty when considering an irreversible investment the realization of which can be postponed for the future. 
The input is outsourced and the investment is privately funded
Suppose now that the input is produced by an upstream …rm with market power that we call C. Adopting the framework presented by Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014), we assume that A and C engage in a leader-follower game at time zero. Moving backwards, A (the follower) decides the optimal investment threshold taking into consideration the constant input price p. Then, C (the leader) decides the optimal p accounting for the production cost I, the structural parameters of the stochastic term y t and A's timing decision.
The optimal investment threshold is derived through the solution of the following maximization problem:
Solving we obtain
The decision problem of C, involves only the choice of p that is derived as the solution of F OS C (y) = max
. Solving we have
Combining the optimal investment trigger from Eq. (6) with the optimal input price from Eq. (7), we obtain y OS p OS = 1 r M 1 I which can be written as
From Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) one can see that both p OS and y OS p OS are decreasing in i.e. are increasing in volatility. This implies that A will probably consider abandoning a very risky project or, in any case, will delay the investment as much as possible. 11 C takes this into account setting a high p OS discounting this way for the delay between the time that p OS is chosen until the time it is cashed. Similarly, a project that involves very little risk will be undertaken relatively quickly by A and this will also be re ‡ected on a lower input price. Note however, that there is a minimum for p OS : lim
p OS = r r a I > I. As one can see, despite the fact that the acceleration of the project is bene…cial for C, s/he is not willing to lower p OS below a minimum r r a I. This has to do with the fact that, for prices below r r a I, the completion of the project is indeed further hastened but what is sacri…ced in terms of cash ‡ow is not remunerated from the additional acceleration of the project.
Combining Eq. (5), (7) and (8) we obtain
Also, for C we have
The following proposition summarizes these …ndings:
Proposition 2 A single …rm that outsources the input and self-…nances the investment project, will enter the market as soon as the scale parameter reaches a threshold y OS p OS = 1 y V I . The value of the option to invest in this project is F OS A (y) = 1 1
Comparing our …ndings from Propositions 1 and 2 we obtain the following:
Proposition 3 When an upstream supplier is responsible for the provision of the input, the investment is postponed y OS > y V I and the potential investor's option to invest is less valuable
As one can see, the e¤ect of the presence of C is twofold. On one hand, it increases the investment threshold delaying the completion of the project and, on the other, it reduces the value of the option to invest for the potential investor A.
The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally funded
Going back to the case of vertical integration, we assume that the potential investor produces the input in-house. However, the realization of the project that A has in mind depends now on the cooperation of an investment partner B. Following Lukas and Welling (2014), B is willing to undertake an exogenously given share 2 (0; 1) of the sunk investment cost, and this allows A to fund only the rest of the project. In return, A and B negotiate over the compensation that the former needs to pay to the latter. More precisely, we assume that at time zero A credibly commits to o¤er a fraction 2 (0; 1) of the project to B. Now B has the option to accept this o¤er immediately disbursing the capital needed for the realization of the project or, alternatively, can delay this contribution for some future time. 12 Similarly to the previous section, we have a leader-follower game with A (the leader) deciding the compensation o¤er and B (the follower) deciding the optimal timing taking the compensation o¤er into account. 13 Starting with the problem of the follower we have F V C B (y) = max
As expected, y V C ( ) is increasing in and decreasing in . This just means that the investment will be postponed as the cost share for the investment partner is increasing, a result that can be neutralized if the potential investor is willing to improve the submitted compensation o¤er. As one can see, A faces a dilemma since a low compensation o¤er implies access to a larger cash ‡ow later in the future whereas a high compensation o¤er shortens the waiting period but gives access to a smaller cash ‡ow in return.
The potential investor takes into consideration the reaction of the investment partner and decides the compensation o¤er that is derived as the solution of the following maximization problem:
which yields
Combining Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) we obtain
Studying the optimal compensation o¤er, we can see that V C is increasing both in and in . Focusing on the e¤ect of , it is interesting to see that the maximum optimal o¤er is always below 100%. This has to do with the fact that a more generous compensation o¤er will indeed hasten the completion of the project but will only make the potential investor worse-o¤ since what is sacri…ced in terms of compensation is not remunerated from the acceleration of the investment.
One can also observe that y V C ( V C ) is increasing in and decreasing in . Actually, the "distance" between y V C ( V C ) and y V I increases in despite the fact that, at the same time,
is also increasing in . This happens because y V C ( V C ) is a linear, whereas V C is a concave function of . In words, despite the fact that the compensation o¤er is becoming more generous as the share of the cost covered by B increases, in real terms the o¤er worsens and this is re ‡ected on a higher investment threshold.
Lastly, combining Eq. (12), (13) and (14) we obtain
Also, for B we have
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4
In the case where the single …rm produces the input in-house but the completion of the project depends on external funding, the investment occurs when the scale parameter reaches a threshold y V C ( V C ) = 1+ 1 y V I . The value of the option to invest in this project is
Comparing our …ndings with the values that we derived in the vertically integrated case we have:
Proposition 5 In the case where the single …rm produces the input in-house but the completion of the project depends on external funding, the investment is delayed y V C > y V I and the potential investor's option to invest is less valuable F V C A (y) < F V I A (y) .
As in Section 3.3, the e¤ect of the presence of the additional agent is twofold since, on one hand, it increases the investment threshold delaying the completion of the project and, on the other, it reduces the value of the option to invest for the potential investor.
The three-agent case
In this section we combine the analyses presented above and we show how the synchronous presence of B and C a¤ects the performance and the actions of A as well as the investment threshold. The three-agent game evolves in the following way:
1. C is the game-leader and decides the input price that maximizes her/his value of the option to invest.
2. Given the input price and the cost share , A submits the compensation o¤er to B and, …nally, 3. B evaluates this compensation o¤er and decides when to accept it, disbursing the amount that is required for the realization of A's project.
Keeping in mind that A and B continuously and veri…ably observe the magnitude of y t whereas C only knows the structural parameters of the related stochastic process, we move backwards and we …rst study the behavior of the investment partner B. The optimal investment threshold is derived through the solution of: F B3 (y) = max
. Solving, we obtain
The potential investor A will take into consideration the decision of the investment partner and will choose the compensation o¤er taking the price of the input as given. The optimal is derived as the solution of F A3 (y) = max
. From the …rst-order condition we have
As one can check, this is exactly the compensation o¤er that we derived in Eq. (13) where C was absent. Obviously, the presence/absence of C does not a¤ect the magnitude of the optimal compensation o¤er that A submits to B since the exogenously given cost share has to do with the generic investment cost no matter if this is I or p.
We conclude with the game-leader C. The input supplier observes the behavior both of A and of B and optimally decides the price of the input solving F C3 (y) = max
which yields:
Comparing Eq. (19) with Eq. (7) we see that p 3 = p OS which means that the presence/absence of B does not a¤ect the optimal price of the input that is decided by C. This is not a surprise since, C is indi¤erent to the means that A uses to fund the project.
Combining Eq. (17), (18) and (19) we derive the investment threshold which, in this case, is
Note that y 3 ( 3 ; p 3 ) is decreasing in and increasing in . Similarly to y V C ( V C ), the "distance" between y 3 ( 3 ; p 3 ) and y V I increases in in spite of the simultaneous improvement of the corresponding compensation o¤er. The reasoning is the same: the investment trigger is a linear whereas the compensation o¤er is a concave function of the cost share . As we have seen in the previous section, despite the fact that the compensation o¤er is becoming more generous as the cost share increases, in real terms the o¤er worsens and actually, in the three-agent case, this e¤ect is even more dramatic since the compensation o¤er worsens "faster" as the (positive) slope of y 3 with respect to is larger than the (positive) slope of y V C with respect to exactly because of the presence of C.
We conclude this section returning to the option values for the three agents. Keeping in mind the values for y 3 ( 3 ; p 3 ) ; p 3 and 3 we obtain
(21.1)
3)
Proposition 6
In the three-agent case where the single …rm outsources the production of the input and the completion of the project depends on external funding, the investment occurs when the scale parameter reaches a threshold y 3 ( 3 ; p 3 ) = 1 1+ 1 y V I . The value of the option to invest in this project for the potential investor is F A3 (y) =
Proposition 7 In the three agent case the investment takes place ine¢ ciently late y 3 ( 3 ; p 3 ) > y V I and this is also re ‡ected on the potential investor's option value F A3 (y) < F V I A (y) .
Discussion
In the previous sections we focused on the e¤ect that the presence of additional agents has on the investment threshold and the potential investor's option value both for the two-agent and the three-agent case. Keeping all this in mind we can examine this e¤ect in the level of the industry as a whole.
The input is outsourced and the investment is privately funded: We have already computed the value of the option to invest for the potential investor A and the input supplier C. Now adding up Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) we obtain
As one can see, the presence of the …rm C a¤ects negatively the value of the option to invest for the whole industry since F OS (y) < F V I A (y).
The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally funded: Summing Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) we obtain
The presence of …rm B a¤ects negatively the value of the option to invest for the whole industry since
The three-agent case: Summing up the values of the option to invest for A, B and C from Eq. (21) we obtain
= 1
A comparison of the results derived in this and the previous sections is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 A comparison among the investment triggers and the option values presented above gives the following rankings:
A number of interesting results can be derived by these comparisons. First of all, we see that as the number of agents involved in an investment project increases, the completion of this project is postponed to the detriment of the investment's option value both in the …rm and in the industry level. As expected, the vertically integrated case represents the most favorable whereas the threeagent case represents the least favorable scenario. Another interesting observation has to do with the comparison between the e¤ect of the presence of the upstream …rm C and the e¤ect of the presence of the investment partner B. As we can see, external funding is preferred to outsourcing in terms of timing and, consequently, in terms of option value. 14 
Numerical Examples
We conclude this section using some numerical examples that will help us illustrate the e¤ect of outsourcing and external funding on the investment timing and the value of the option to enter the new market.
We assume that the parameters vary as follows: We let the drift, , and the volatility, , take values {0.025, 0.035} and {0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4} respectively. A high magnitude of the drift captures a high expected increase in the size of the new market whereas di¤erent levels of volatility are used to demonstrate the impact of uncertainty on the investment thresholds and option values. The sunk investment cost I takes values {24, 48} whereas both the initial level of the stochastic parameter y 0 and the instantaneous monopolistic pro…t per unit of y t , M , are set equal to unity (y 0 = M = 1). We allow for three di¤erent levels of exogenous cost share: 1 = 0:1, 2 = 0:5 and 3 = 0:9 in order to demonstrate how the participation of an investment partner a¤ects the timing and the performance of the investment project. The interest rate r is initially set equal to 5% but we also check the e¤ect of an increase to 6% which corresponds to a higher opportunity cost of capital.
In Table 1 , we use = 0:025; = 0:2; r = 0:05; y 0 = 1; = 0:5 and I = 24 and we obtain the values that serve as our standard of comparison. As one can check, Table 1 demonstrates how the investment threshold and the value of the option to invest in a given project are a¤ected by the presence of an investment partner and/or the presence of an upstream …rm. In accordance to Proposition 8, we see that the presence of any alien agent causes the procrastination of the investment. The investment threshold is, roughly, doubled when an investment partner is involved, and tripled when a necessary input is outsourced. However, the combined e¤ect is more dramatic since, under both outsourcing and external funding, the investment threshold is more than six times higher than the investment threshold under vertical integration.
As for the project value itself, we see that the changes in the investment threshold are also re ‡ected on the value of the option to invest. The project depreciates whenever its completion depends on the contribution of one of the other two parties, with outsourcing being less preferable than an investment partnership but more preferable than the three-agent case. Interestingly, under external funding the investor's share of the project is equal to 71% of her/his share under vertical integration whereas, when outsourcing is explicitly taken into consideration the percentage drops to 42%. Unsurprisingly, a similar e¤ect is observed when one studies the value of the option to invest in the level of the industry. Arguably, these results underline the di¤erence that the nature of the investment cost (endogenous or exogenous) can make when an investment project characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility is considered. In Table 2 we examine the e¤ect that a change in the cost I has on the investment thresholds and the option values presented above. For I = 48, i.e. for an investment cost two times higher than our standard of comparison, all the investment thresholds are doubled in magnitude and all the option values drop to, about, 73% of their corresponding values given in Table 1 . Starting with the investment thresholds, it is evident that a potential investor will have less rush to invest in a, other things equal, more expensive project. As for the depreciation of the option values, one can argue that two opposing forces drive this result. On one hand, the value of the option to delay a costly and irreversible investment is valuable, and this value is expected to increase in I since, the more expensive the investment, the more valuable the option to postpone it. On the other hand however, the higher investment threshold implies a further delay of the investment which eventually distances the anticipated cash ‡ow further in the future. As one can see, the second force prevails. 
In Table 3 , we study the e¤ect that changes in the drift, , may have. A comparison of the option values of Table 3 with the ones that we derived in Table 1 shows that an increase in the expected growth rate from = 0:025 to = 0:035, is bene…cial both in the …rm and in the industry level. However, the e¤ect of such a change in the investment triggers is not as obvious. Actually, we observe that a higher is, ceteris paribus, encouraging the acceleration of a project under vertical integration but is causing the further postponement of projects the completion of which is conditional on the participation of a second or a third party. Especially, in the three-agent case, we see that a = 0:01 is enough to (more than) double the related investment threshold. The intuition behind this result has to do exactly with the absence or the presence of the alien …rms. When the potential investor acts unilaterally, a positive change in signals the shortening of the expected waiting period until the right time for the investment to take place has come. This, of course, is re ‡ected on a lower investment threshold. 15 Nevertheless, under the presence of an upstream supplier and/or an investment partner, the situation is quite di¤erent. The upstream …rm updates the price of the input asking a higher price whereas the compensation o¤er that the investment partner receives is now readjusted for the higher . Eventually, the time-deciding agent accounts for these changes choosing a higher, instead of lower, investment threshold. As for the volatility , in Figure 1 and Figure 2 we see how an increase in from = 0:2 to = 0:4 a¤ects the timing and the value of the option to invest in the project under consideration. 1 5 As we can see from Eq. (3), this is actually the e¤ect of two opposing forces. On one hand, a higher a implies a higher present value for the pro…t ‡ow which is the factor that corrects the investment threshold for uncertainty and irreversibility. Apparently, under vertical integration, the …rst force prevails.
As expected, all the investment thresholds are increasing in . As is standard in the real option literature, the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility calls for a more careful investment policy. Hence, investment projects should occur at higher return levels, a decision which in turn requires waiting longer before investing. Note however that higher investment thresholds do not cause the depreciation of the value of the corresponding project. On the contrary, a higher volatility is, as anticipated, increasing the value of the option to delay the completion of an investment project characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility.
What is interesting to see here is that the investment threshold in the three-agent case is signi…-cantly more sensitive to an increase in volatility with respect to the other three investment scenarios that we study, a result which is also re ‡ected on a proportionately higher option value. As before, the intuition here is that the investment threshold under both outsourcing and external funding is a¤ected both by the decisions of the project originator and by the actions of the investment partner and the upstream …rm which are also a¤ected by changes in . For instance, we know that the upstream …rm anticipates that an increase in will further delay the completion of the investment project. This foresight calls for the decision of a higher input price that will act as compensation against this (further) delayed cash ‡ow. Similarly, the project originator also anticipates a (further) postponement in the completion of the project and, using analogous reasoning, decides to decrease the submitted compensation o¤er. Finally, the time-deciding investment partner observes the increase in as well as the updated input price and compensation o¤er and chooses an appropriately high investment threshold that accounts for all this. In Table 4 we focus on the impact that a change in the exogenous investment cost share may have. The benchmark value that we choose is = 0:5 which implies a perfectly balanced investment scheme with both partners undertaking equal portions of the sunk cost. We subsequently allow both for high ( = 0:9) and for low ( = 0:1) investment cost shares and we also present, for comparison's sake, the case where there is no partnership ( = 0). Starting with the investment thresholds, we note that a higher involvement of an investment partner always implies the postponement of the project. Of course, keeping in mind the analysis of Section 3.4 and Section 4.1, this is hardly a surprise. As we have already seen there, a higher cost share implies a higher nominal, but lower real, compensation o¤er from the project originator to the investment partner. Eventually, this is re ‡ected on a higher investment threshold and the further procrastination of the investment.
The e¤ect of a change in on the option values of the three parties is nothing but an extension of the e¤ect that we observe in the investment triggers. A higher causes the depreciation of the value of the option to invest for every party apart from the investment partner who is favored by such a change. This adverse e¤ect is also clearly re ‡ected on the option value of the industry as a whole.
Lastly, in Table 5 we study the e¤ect of a change in the interest rate r. We start with the vertically integrated case. As far as the investment threshold is concerned, two opposing forces are acting. On one hand, an increase in r makes the potential investor more impatient since, with a higher interest rate, the present becomes relatively more important than the future which implies the selection of a lower investment threshold. At the same time however, the increase in r implies a decrease in the present value of the pro…t ‡ow that the project is meant to generate once it takes place. This limits the interest of the potential investor to invest right now in a project which does not cover the high opportunity cost of capital. As we see in Table 5 , the second force prevails causing the postponement of the investment.
In the case where we deal with an investment partnership, an increase in the interest rate from 0.05 to 0.06 causes a similar e¤ect but of smaller magnitude. The analysis of the previous paragraph holds here as well. However, we need to take into account the fact that the investment trigger is now also a¤ected by the change in the compensation o¤er that is submitted to the time-deciding agent. The project originator, being impatient her/himself, is willing to make a more generous compensation o¤er in an attempt to shorten the waiting period till the completion of the project. As one can see, this makes a di¤erence almost neutralizing the increase in r.
The most interesting cases involve the participation of the upstream …rm. Despite the fact that the argumentation from above still applies, the presence of an impatient upstream …rm causes, as one can see in Table 5 , the acceleration of the investment. In order to understand the intuition behind this result, one should keep in mind that the e¤ect of a change in r is di¤erent for the upstream …rm than it is for the two investment partners. It is true that all the involved …rms discount the value of the option to invest with a common discount factor. 16 However, the way that each agent evaluates the net present value of the project at the delivery date is di¤erent. For the two investment partners, the completion of the investment project signals the commencing of a pro…t ‡ow that needs to be appropriately discounted. Of course, a change in r a¤ects the chosen discounting factor. On the contrary, when the delivery date is reached, the upstream …rm receives a lump sum which corresponds to the price of the input that s/he supplied and which is not a¤ected by changes in r. As a consequence, even a small increase in the discount rate is enough to make the upstream supplier su¢ ciently impatient and willing to ask a lower input price as soon as this will lead to the acceleration of the investment. Indeed, in Table 5 we see that, when an upstream …rm is present, an increased discount rate encourages the acceleration of the completion of the project, a result which is most prevalent in the three-agent case where the impatience of the two alien agents concurs.
As for the value of the option to invest, we see that even a slightly increased interest rate can considerably reduce the project's option value. As we have already stressed above, an increased interest rate implies that the present becomes …nancially more important than the future. Hence, 1 6 Recall that in Section 3.3 we have for all three agents. the option to delay an investment project for some future time point naturally becomes less valuable. 5 The compensation as the product of Nash bargaining
In Section 3.4 and in Section 4 we used a non-cooperative setting in order to describe the interaction between the potential investor A and the investment partner B. However, as noticed by the extant literature, co-development partnerships are an increasingly utilized way of improving pro…tability, competitiveness and innovation e¤ectiveness. 17 In the following, we will attempt to re-approach the potential investor's business plan using a cooperative framework. More precisely, we assume that the compensation o¤er will now be replaced by a Nash bargaining solution that will explicitly re ‡ect the bargaining power of the involved agents. We begin with the two-agent case and we subsequently allow for outsourcing.
The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally funded
Similarly to the presentation of Section 3.4, we assume that A can produce the input in-house and that the completion of the project is conditional on the participation of a …rm B who acts like an investment partner. As before, B is willing to undertake a share of the sunk investment cost given that s/he will receive compensation in return. What is new here with respect to the analysis of Section 3.4 is that, by assumption, A agrees with B on the compensation share and then decides the optimal investment threshold. Note that, contrary to the initial analysis, we now assume that A, not B, is the time deciding agent. Apparently, A sacri…ces her/his exclusivity on the decision of in order to become the time-deciding agent and similarly B sacri…ces her/his position as the time-deciding agent in order to have a say in the decision of . 18 In the following we see under what conditions this cooperative framework can replace the non-cooperative one. Starting with the maximization problem of the time-deciding agent we have:
Moving one step back, the two parties bargain anticipating that A will invest as soon as y t reaches the trigger y N ( ). Given this, the new optimal compensation share is derived as the solution of
, (27) where B represents B's bargaining power. 19 Solving we obtain
Combining Eq. (26) and Eq. (28) we have
One can check that the compensation N increases linearly in B . 20 It is also true that, contrary to the compensation o¤ers that we have encountered in the previous sections, N is not always increasing in , hence decreasing in volatility. More precisely, here we have
In words, the compensation o¤er is decreasing in volatility only when the bargaining power of B is su¢ ciently low. Another interesting point is that when B bears almost the whole investment cost ( ! 1), we obtain N ' 1. Contrary to the compensation o¤er V C that cannot be larger than 1 , N can reach values as high as 100%, irrespective of the magnitude of , if the cost share of the time-deciding agent A is small enough.
As far as the investment threshold is concerned, one can see that, as expected, y N ( N ) is increasing in B 21 and that in the special case where B = we have exactly y N ( N ) = y V I . In general, when the bargaining power of B is smaller (larger) than the exogenously given , the investment takes place ine¢ ciently early (late). Finally, one can check that
which means that when the bargaining power of B is su¢ ciently low (high), an increase in volatility results in a lower (higher) investment threshold y N ( N ) relative to y V I . Given y N ( N ) and N , we can compute the value of the option to invest both for the potential investor and for the investment partner. For A we obtain
and for B we have
Of course the two agents will choose the Nash bargaining solution over the non-cooperative one only hold simultaneously. 1 9 It is assumed that the distribution of bargaining power is exogenous and that A + B = 1 with A 0 and B 0, where i is the bargaining power of agent i with i 2 fA; Bg. 2 0 One can also check that N is increasing and convex in . 2 1 One can also check that yN ( N ) is linearly decreasing in . 2 2 Note that, as expected,
It is interesting to see that the condition F AN (y) F V C A (y) implies > B which basically means that the Nash bargaining solution guarantees that the investment will take place (ine¢ -ciently) early: y N ( N ) < y V I . Let's recall that when we solved the same problem under the non-cooperative framework in Section 3.4, we found that the investment would take place inef…ciently late: y V C ( V C ) > y V I . Comparing these two results we derive a quite straightforward conclusion: the adopted game-theoretic framework determines the nature of the interaction between A and B as well as the way that this is re ‡ected on the chosen investment threshold and the value of the option to invest. The importance of this statement will become clearer in the next section where the three-agent case is discussed. Summing up our results:
Proposition 9 In the case where the input is produced in-house and the completion of the project depends on external funding, the Nash bargaining solution can replace the non-cooperative one when the participation conditions
and F BN (y)
are satis…ed. If this is the case, then the investment occurs when the scale parameter reaches a threshold
which means that a Nash bargaining solution guarantees that the investment will take place ine¢ ciently early. Table 1 we see that, as expected, the option values of both parties are appreciated and that the investment threshold under Nash bargaining is smaller than the investment threshold under vertical integration.
The three-agent case
Let's now see what is di¤erent if a third agent is involved in the completion of the project. Similarly to the presentation of Section 4 it is assumed that the input is produced by an external supplier with market power. The game evolves in the following way:
1. The upstream …rm C decides the input price that maximizes her/his individual option value. 2. Given the price of the input, A and B engage in a Nash bargaining in order to decide the compensation that A will submit to B and …nally, 3 . A decides what is the optimal investment threshold given the price of the input and the decided compensation.
Moving backwards, we begin by studying the behavior of A. The optimal investment threshold in the three-agent case is derived as the solution of the following maximization problem:
From the …rst-order condition we obtain
Given y 3N ( ; p), A and B engage in a Nash bargaining in order to commonly decide the optimal compensation 3N which is derived as the solution of
Unsurprisingly, we …nd 3N = N : The intuition behind this result is that, as in the non-cooperative case, the presence/absence of C does not a¤ect the interaction between A and B since the exogenously given cost share has to do with the generic investment cost no matter if that is I or p. Finally, the input supplier C observes how A and B behave and chooses the familiar ( 3N ;p 3N ) . Apparently, the price that maximizes the value of the option to invest for the upstream …rm is not a¤ected by the distribution of bargaining power between A and B. Again, C is indi¤erent to the means that A uses to fund her/his project. Now, substituting 3N and p 3N in the formula for the investment threshold we obtain
Similarly to y N ( N ), the threshold y 3N ( 3N ; p 3N ) is increasing in B . 23 One can also check that, contrary to the two-agent case where we had
here we have
< 0 which means that as the volatility of the scale parameter increases, the relative investment threshold gets larger, irrespective of how B compares to . This has to do with the fact that the delivery price p 3N , contrary to I, is increasing in the volatility of the scale parameter and, as a result, there is no level of bargaining power low enough to guarantee a negative relationship between the relative investment threshold and the volatility. As a consequence, we have y 3N ( 3N ; p 3N ) > y V I . Note that this is the result of two opposing forces. On one hand, the interaction between A and B drives the investment threshold below y V I but, 24 on the other, the e¤ect of the presence of C has the opposite direction. 25 Apparently the second one prevails. It is interesting to recall here that when we discussed the three-agent case under the non-cooperative setting in Section 4, we similarly had y 3 ( 3 ; p 3 ) > y V I . However, there the two e¤ects were not opposing but, on the contrary, they were complementing each other. As a result, the importance of explicitly taking C into account was, to some extent, less obvious.
We conclude with the value of the option to invest for the three agents and we have
A (y); (37.1)
A and B will choose the Nash bargaining solution over the non-cooperative one only if F A3N (y) F A3 (y) and F B3N (y) F B3 (y). As in the previous section, we …nd that if the conditions (1 ) hold simultaneously, then both A and B are better 2 3 Note that, similarly to yN ( N ), y3N ( 3N ; p3N ) is linearly decreasing in . 2 4 This …rst e¤ect was discussed in Section 5.1. 2 5 This second e¤ect was discussed in Section 3.3.
o¤. Once again this has to do with the fact that the presence/absence of C does not a¤ect the interaction between A and B. Finally, as far as C is concerned, the Nash bargaining solution is preferred to the non-cooperative one when F C3N (y)
. One can easily check that this is always the case since F A3N (y)
Concluding we have:
Proposition 10 In the case where the input is outsourced and the completion of the project depends on external funding, the Nash bargaining solution can replace the non-cooperative one when the participation conditions F A3N (y)
F V C B (y) hold simultaneously. If this is the case, the investment occurs when the scale parameter reaches a threshold y 3N ( 3N ; p 3N Table 1 we see that, as expected, the option values of all three parties are appreciated and that the investment threshold under Nash bargaining is larger than the investment threshold under vertical integration.
Epilogue
In this paper we consider the investment problem of a …rm who contemplates entering an uncertain new market under two conditions. On one hand, an upstream …rm with market power is responsible for the provision of a discrete input that is a prerequisite for the completion of the project and, on the other, an exogenously given share of the sunk investment cost is undertaken by an investment partner who claims a share of the project as compensation in return.
Following the real option approach, we build a stochastic dynamic programming model in order to study the interaction among these three agents and we …nd the following. Firstly, we verify that the optimal investment timing and, consequently, the maximum value of the option to invest are reached when the potential investor acts autonomously (vertically integrated case). On the contrary, the presence of any additional agent involved in the completion of the project causes the delay of the investment which, as we show, also implies a smaller value of the option to invest. However, despite the fact that the presence of any additional agent a¤ects the timing and the value of the option to invest the same way, the magnitude of the e¤ect itself is not the same. Actually, a comparison between external funding and input outsourcing denotes that the former is always preferred to the latter.
Secondly, we focus on the three-agent case and we …nd that the synchronous involvement of an upstream supplier and an investment partner in the project, constitutes the worst-case scenario since we basically deal with a combination of the corresponding distorting e¤ects. In this case, the value of the option to invest reaches its minimum whereas the investment threshold reaches its maximum.
In the last part of the paper we present the conditions under which it is possible to replace the original non-cooperative setting with a Nash bargaining solution and we show that, even in that case, the optimal investment threshold is unattainable. Actually, our analysis shows that if the upstream …rm is absent (i.e. the input is produced in-house) the project realizes ine¢ ciently early whereas, if the upstream …rm is present (i.e. the input is outsourced) it realizes ine¢ ciently late. This is, again, evidence of the importance of the nature of the sunk investment cost when modelling investment projects characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility, especially if instead of a single potential investor, an investment partner is also involved in their completion.
A Appendix
A.1 The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally funded: A review of Section 3.4
In the main body of the paper we describe the interaction between a potential investor A and an investment partner B following the presentation by Lukas and Welling (2014) according to which A is the game-leader submitting the compensation o¤er and B is the game-follower choosing the investment timing. This framework seems suitable to describe the e¤orts of a potential investor who seeks out funding for the business plan that is under consideration. However, one can also consider the case where B is the game-leader submitting the compensation o¤er and A is the game-follower deciding the investment timing. This framework seems more appropriate to describe partnerships in which a venture capitalist makes the …rst step declaring her/his interest to invest in an emerging …rm. 27 Moving backwards, we …nd that the solution of A's decision problem gives an investment threshold y RV C = 1 1 y V I whereas the solution of B's decision problem gives a compensation share RV C = 1 2 + . 28 Combining the two we …nd that the optimal investment threshold is given by
As far as the value of the option to invest is concerned, we …nd that for the potential investor A we have
whereas for the investment partner B we obtain 
A.2 The three-agent case: A review of Section 4
In this section we review the three-agent case as presented in Section 4 assuming however that A and B swap places. More precisely:
1. C is still the game-leader who decides the input price. 2. Given the price of the input, B decides what is the optimal compensation that s/he should ask from A and 3. A decides what is the optimal investment threshold given the price of the input and the compensation share.
Solving backwards, from the potential investor's maximization problem we obtain y 3R ( ; p) = 2 8 Check that RV C , similarly to V C , is increasing in , but contrary to V C is decreasing in . 2 9 Note that y RV C , similarly to y V C , is decreasing in , but contrary to y V C is decreasing in . = RV C . 30 Finally, the upstream …rm, keeping in mind the reactions of A and B, decides the optimal price of the input p 3R = 1 I. Plugging the compensation o¤er and the input price in the formula for the investment threshold we obtain
Given this, we also have
A (y); (A.5.1)
Similarly to Section 4, we …nd that the synchronous presence of B and C causes the postponement of the project and that this is also re ‡ected on A's option value. 
(y) and 5) F C3R (y) < F OS C (y). Comparing Proposition 11 (where B is the game-leader and A is the game-follower) with Proposition 8 (where A is the game-leader and B is the game-follower) we …nd that, in both cases, as the number of agents involved in an investment project increases, the completion of the project is postponed at the expense of the project's option value both in the …rm and in the industry level. We also …nd that the rankings of the investment thresholds and the aggregate option values remain the same whereas the only di¤erence that we observe has to do with the ranking of A's option values. As one can see, when A is the game-follower (game-leader), an interaction with C (B) is preferred to an interaction with B (C) which means that the way that A is a¤ected by the presence of the alien …rms depends on the role that s/he has in the game.
Another interesting point is that
y) which means that being the game-leader is always preferable, no matter the values of and . Finally, one can also check that y RV C RV C ? y V C V C and y 3R ( 3R ; p 3R ) ? y 3 ( 3 ; p 3 ), and consequently that F RV C (y) 7 F V C (y) and F 3R (y) 7 F 3 (y), when 0:5 ? . In words, it is socially optimal for the agent who undertakes the lion's share of the sunk investment cost to be the game-leader either when the input is outsourced or not. This means that the analysis of the main body of the paper where A is the game-leader and B is the game-follower would be preferred from a social point of view for 0:5 < whereas the analysis presented here would be socially preferable for 0:5 > .
3 0 Check that the equality 3R = RV C is analogous to the equality 3 = V C that we …nd in Section 4 of the main body of the paper. In Section A.1 of Appendix A we presented a leader-follower game where B decides the compensation and, given that, A chooses the optimal investment threshold. Let's now see what is di¤erent if the compensation is the product of bargaining between the two agents. The game evolves in the following way: initially A and B bargain over the compensation share and then, given that, B decides the optimal investment threshold. Notice that contrary to Section A.1, the time-deciding agent is B, not A. Alternatively put, our goal in this section is to …nd the conditions under which A would be willing to let B decide the timing of the investment, given that the compensation share will be the product of bargaining between the two agents instead of a unilateral decision of B.
Starting with the maximization problem of the time-deciding agent B we obtain y N R = y V I . Moving one step back, the two parties bargain anticipating that B will invest as soon as y t reaches the threshold y N R . Given this, the bargaining over the compensation share gives N R = Given the compensation o¤er and the optimal investment threshold, we can compute the value of the option to invest both for the potential investor and for the time-deciding investment partner. More precisely, for A we obtain hold simultaneously. One can also easily check that the condition F BN R (y) F RV C B (y) implies < B which means that any Nash bargaining solution guarantees that the investment will take place (ine¢ ciently) early. Note that this is no di¤erent from what we found in Section 5.1 of the main body of the paper.
B.2 The three-agent case: A review of Section 5.2
Let's now see what is di¤erent if the input is outsourced. Our starting point is again the investment threshold decision by B. From the …rst-order condition we have y 3N R ( ; p) = 1 r a M p . Moving one step back, A and B bargain anticipating that B will invest as soon as y t reaches the chosen 3 2 One can check that the compensation share N R increases linearly in B and that it is also increasing and concave in . This basically means that in the special case where B = we have exactly yNR( N R ) = y V I but, in general, when the bargaining power of B is su¢ ciently low (high), an increase in volatility results in a higher (lower) investment threshold yNR( N R ) relative to y V I .
threshold and eventually choose 3N R = 1+ B 1+ (= N R ). 34 Finally, the game-leader C observes the behavior of A and B and decides the input price p 3N R = 1 I.
Substituting the optimal price and the compensation o¤er in the investment threshold from above we have y 3N R ( 3N R ; p 3N R ) = 1 1 + 1 + B y V I : (B.4)
Note that y 3N R ( 3N R ; p 3N R ) > y V I . 35 This is the result of two opposing forces. On one hand, the interaction between A and B drives the investment trigger below y V I but, 36 on the other, the e¤ect of the presence of C has the opposite direction. 37 Apparently, the second one prevails. It is interesting to recall that Eq. (A.4) that corresponds to the non-cooperative case gives also an investment threshold higher than y V I : y 3R ( 3R ; p 3R ) > y V I . However, there the two e¤ects were not opposing but, on the contrary, they were complementing each other. Note that our analysis here is totally symmetric to the one presented in Section 5.2 of the main body of the paper. Keeping in mind the formulas for 3N R , p 3N R and y 3N R ( 3N R ; p 3N R ), the option values for the three agents are hold simultaneously. As far as C is concerned, the Nash bargaining solution is preferred to the non-cooperative one when F C3N R (y) F C3R (y) ) 1+ B 1+
1
. One can easily see that this is always the case since F B3N R (y) F B3R (y) implies F C3N R (y) F C3R (y). Concluding we have:
Proposition 12 In the case where the input is outsourced and the completion of the project depends on external funding, the Nash bargaining solution 38 can replace the non-cooperative one 39 when the participation conditions F A3N R (y) F A3R (y) , F AN R (y) F RV C A (y) and F B3N R (y) F B3R (y) , F BN R (y) F RV C B (y) hold simultaneously. If this is the case, the investment occurs when the scale parameter reaches a threshold y 3N R ( 3N R ; p 3N R ) = 1 1+ 1+ B y V I > y V I i.e. the investment takes place ine¢ ciently late. Despite the fact that the presence of B favors the acceleration of the project 40 the presence of C, which dictates the postponement of the investment, prevails. 3 4 Check that the equality 3N R = N R is analogous to the equality 3N = N that we …nd in Section 5.2 of the main body of the paper. 3 5 Note also that @ y 3N R ( 3N R ;p 3N R ) y V I @ < 0. 3 6 This e¤ect was discussed in Section B.1 of Appendix B. 3 7 This e¤ect was discussed in Section 3.3 of the main body of the paper. 
